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Role of Remuneration Committee in Narrative Human capital Disclosure
ABSTRACT
This study empirically investigates whether independent directors on the remuneration
committee influence narrative human capital disclosure (NAHCD) in firms where independent
directors dominate the board composition. NAHCD is measured by frequency of occurrence,
using latent content analysis in the annual reports of the top 30 listed firms on the Colombo
Stock Exchange from 1998 to 2006. This study examines two attributes of corporate governance,
controlling for other corporate governance attributes and firm-level attributes. The findings
highlight the importance of considering a firm’s independent director involvement in the
remuneration committee when determining NAHCD strategy.
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AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
BOARD SIZE AND COMMITTEES, AND NARRATIVE HUMAN
CAPITAL DISCLOSURE
INTRODUCTION
Purpose
This study empirically examines whether independent directors on the remuneration
committee affect narrative human capital disclosure (NAHCD) where independent directors
dominate a firm’s board composition. The remuneration committee and the audit committee are
the two committees most commonly mandated by the corporate governance codes applicable to
listed firms across nations. This is particularly relevant to the contemporary global business
context, as the ratio of independent to executive directors in listed firms has significantly
increased in the past decades (Kor and Sundaramurthy, 2009). However, independent directors’
influence in communicating information to shareholders about human capital of firms is largely
unexplored. Investigation into independent directors’ participation in these two committees
affect NAHCD is particularly important to the businesses, as businesses have a responsibility to
inform shareholders about future earnings from their anecdotally most-valued asset of human
capital. More specifically, this study adds to the knowledge of how corporate governance
(specifically, the remuneration committee) influences NAHCD. To examine this relationship,
this study investigates the NAHCD of the top 30 listed firms by market capitalization on the
Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE) in Sri Lanka over a nine-year period (from 1998 to 2006), using
the corporate governance attributes identified by the Code of Best Practice on Corporate
Governance in Sri Lanka. Shareholders consider these firms to set the best practice, and they
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represent around 60% of the market capitalization of the CSE (CSE, 1999). The CSE introduced
the Code of Best Practice on Corporate Governance as a best-practice mandatory code (hereafter
labelled “the best-practice code”) effective from 2008; hence, the study period pre-dates the
introduction of the best-practice code.
Importance of Sri Lanka
An adult literacy rate of 90.8%, unusually high for a developing country, makes the best
practice of Sri Lankan companies an interesting sample to examine NAHCD, as these companies
are beneficiaries of this highly literate labour force. Furthermore, during this study period, Sri
Lanka took several steps to drive its economy towards a private-sector-led, knowledge-based
economy, enhancing the importance of human capital. These steps included amendments to the
Code of Intellectual Property Act 1979 (Wickremaratne, 2000), identifying the human capital
base in Sri Lanka as a major thrust area, and providing incentives to develop and protect
intellectual property (BOI, 2000). The top 30 companies are some of the biggest employers of
the Sri Lankan private sector, due to their size, and they depend greatly on their staff for
commercial success. The prevailing civil war between the Sri Lankan government and Tamil
separatists during the study period required companies to be more convincing to shareholders
about future earnings, in order to sustain their interest, especially from a most-valued human
capital base not captured in financial statements. The competitive advantage obtained from a
highly literate, low-cost labour force in Sri Lanka enables firms to optimize profits and capital
gains at a favourable advantage to both domestic and foreign investors. The findings of this study
provide insights into the role of independent directors in providing NAHCD in an increasingly
common board composition dominated by independent directors. This study also contributes to
furthering the understanding of corporate governance practices related to NAHCD, a topic
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seldom explored in listed firms. The study will facilitate comparison with the corporate
governance attributes of firms in developed countries and in settings where boards have various
proportions of independent director representation.
Independent Directors
Since the top 30 firms are visible targets for investors’ demands, the firms respond to
these demands by including more independent1 directors with diverse business and communal
skills on the board to enhance the firms’ prestige and legitimacy. The reputational effect of these
independent directors has a positive association with the firms’ value, brings more investment
opportunities, and enhances the perceived civic responsibility of firms (Ting, 2009). In this
study, more than two-thirds of the directors on the boards are independent; that is, they are
external to the firm. They bring a diverse range of skills to the firm, but lack firm-specific,
detailed information due to their lack of daily involvement in the business. This study expects
that a high proportion of independent directors make the board dependent on their involvement
in the remuneration committee to obtain firm-specific, forward-looking, and value-relevant
information. This is particularly relevant to NAHCD, which is comprised of non-measurable
assets that are difficult for competitors to imitate and to which it is difficult to assign accurate
financial values (Barth, Kasznik, and McNichols, 2001). The independent directors sitting on the
remuneration committee can obtain firm-specific, detailed human capital information and
provide input to the board for NAHCD in annual reports. Although independent directors on the
audit committee can provide a limited amount of firm-specific, forward-looking information on
human capital, this study expects that independent directors on the remuneration committee
acquire much of this knowledge. The larger boards can pool their expertise in making decisions

1

In the Sri Lankan context independent directors are non-executive directors are interchangeable.
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about this disclosure. In the absence of a remuneration committee, this study expects
independent directors on the audit committee to become the sole providers of limited NAHCD.
Consistent with the prediction, this study finds that independent directors on
remuneration committees facilitate communication to boards regarding human capital. The
proportion of independent directors on the board and the number of meetings has no influence on
NAHCD. The monitoring role of the board in having more board meetings and resolving
conflicting agendas between shareholders and management has little relevance for NAHCD.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the Sri Lankan
context of corporate governance. Section 3 outlines the relevant literature and the resource
dependence perspective. Section 4 develops the hypotheses. Section 5 details the research
methods, sample selection, and the governance and disclosure measures employed in the
empirical testing of this study. Section 6 presents the results and conclusions, including the
impact of corporate governance attributes and control variables.

SRI LANKAN CONTEXT
Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE)
The CSE in Sri Lanka differs greatly from stock exchanges in the developed world in
terms of market capitalization, and foreign investment flows. The CSE, which is Sri Lanka’s
only stock exchange, is of high national significance for economic growth. However, it is
relatively a small capital market measured by market capitalization, and relies on foreign
investors to maintain its liquidity and to bridge the gap between investments and savings (CSE,
1997). The two indicators of market liquidity—market capitalization as a percentage of GDP
(6.59% in 2002, 33% in 2006) and trade value as a percentage of market capitalization—reveal
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that the CSE has the lowest liquidity level in the South Asian region (CSE, 1998: 10; De Silva,
2006; World Bank, 2002). Market capitalization of the CSE in 2006 was around USD8 billion
for the 237 listed firms (De Silva, 2006; Lanka Newspapers, 2005).
Corporate Governance in Sri Lanka
In 1997, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Sri Lanka established a voluntary code
of corporate governance related to the financial aspects of firms. In 2002, the Institute of
Chartered Accountants of Sri Lanka established a code of best practice for audit committees. In
2005, it joined with the Securities and Exchange Commission of Sri Lanka to develop the bestpractice code, in an effort to ensure that Sri Lankan standards of corporate governance were
comparable to best practice elsewhere in the world (SECSL and ICASL, 2008; Wickramasinghe,
2006). Until 2008, listed firms on the CSE self-regulated their corporate governance practices.
The World Bank report on the observance of standards and codes in 2004 stated that the
corporate accounting practices of firms in Sri Lanka had improved over the previous decade.
This report cited the enactment of the Sri Lanka Accounting and Auditing Standards Act (1995)
and the establishment of the Accounting and Auditing Standards Monitoring Board in 1995 as
two positive actions taken towards furthering improvement of the quality of financial reporting.
Among measures to ensure and strengthen regulatory capacity, the report stressed the urgent
need for a system of independent oversight of the auditing profession to protect the public
interest (ROSC, 2004).
The Sri Lanka Accounting and Auditing Standards Act No. 15 of 1995 provides
institutional arrangements for setting accounting and auditing standards and for monitoring their
implementation in specific business enterprises. Specific business enterprises include all firms on
stock exchanges, public firms, and other firms meeting specific criteria set forth in the
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Companies Act of Sri Lanka (Companies Act, 1982). The Institute of Chartered Accountants in
Sri Lanka is empowered to issue accounting and auditing standards applicable to specific
business enterprises (Sri Lanka Accounting and Auditing Standards Act, 1995). Publicly trading
firms in Sri Lanka are required to comply with the Securities and Exchange Commission of Sri
Lanka Act No. 36 of 1987 (amended in 2003), which imposes additional rules and requirements,
including compliance with accounting and auditing standards, to protect shareholders. The
memorandum of understanding with the Accounting and Auditing Standards Monitoring Board
requires the Securities and Exchange Commission to refer firms not complying with accounting
and auditing standards to the monitoring board to determine further action. The Institute of
Chartered Accountants in Sri Lanka publishes the accounting standards in the Government
Gazette; once published, the standards become best-practice code for practising accountants and
applicable firms (ROSC, 2004). Since 2006, Sri Lanka has adopted and implemented
international accounting standards in full to establish global comparability of financial reporting.
As the private sector is the major engine of growth in the Sri Lankan economy, the bestpractice code is a response to corporate collapses that were taking place in major developed
economies, to protect shareholders of the listed firms on the CSE and to sustain Sri Lanka’s
economic growth. While offering directors the freedom to make business decisions, the intention
of the best-practice code is that directors exercise that freedom within a framework that ensures
accountability and transparency for the best interests of the stakeholders, particularly
shareholders (Wickramasinghe, 2006). The best-practice code recommends at least two boardappointed committees: the audit committee and the remuneration committee.
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REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Narrative Disclosure
Construction of narrative disclosure is a board-approved activity, enabling directors to
provide reasons for their decisions. The use of NAHCD serves not only to help shareholders
understand management activity but also to signal future board action and organizational change
(Dumay, 2008). Although not referring explicitly to human capital, research on narrative
disclosure has produced mixed results, some suggesting that narrative disclosure assists in
improving the stock return (Schleicher, Hussainey, and Walker, 2007), whereas other studies
conclude that it has little impact on investment decisions (Milne and Chan, 1999). There is,
however, agreement that narrative is a powerful way to communicate meaning clearly to
stakeholders (Weick, 1995, pp. 128–129), that the constructive potential of its messages is wellknown (Yolles, 2007), and that it is a mechanism for understanding human capital (Mouritsen,
Bukh, Larsen, and Johansen, 2001; Mouritsen, Larsen, and Bukh, 2001).
Surveying the Fortune 500 firms, a PricewaterhouseCoopers study (2007) finds that even
the most technically astute investing community has difficulty understanding the performance
disclosure in financial statements in corporate annual reports. Additionally, narrative disclosure
contributes to the transparency and understandability of current financial reporting, and to
increased dialogue between shareholders and firms—the two key players in capital markets.
Human Capital and NAHCD
Human capital takes the broad view that intangibles have economic value for the firm.
Human capital can be conceptualized in various ways; in this study, human capital refers to a
combination of factors possessed by a firm’s staff individually and collectively. It can comprise
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knowledge, skills, and technical ability; personal traits such as intelligence, energy, attitude,
reliability, and commitment; ability to learn, including aptitude, imagination, and creativity; and
desire to share information, participate in a team, and focus on the goals of the firm (Fitz-enz,
2000).
The relevance of NAHCD for forward-looking decision-making finds major consensus
among many academicians and shareholders (Beattie, 1999; Lev, 2001). Shareholders are the
ultimate owners of the firm, and directors execute accountability with NAHCD to shareholders
about future earnings to improve market efficiency (Grojer, 2001; Walker, 2006). The value of
human capital as a collection of intangibles is documented as a compelling case for its disclosure
(Lev and Zambon, 2003). Abdel-Khalik (2003) uses executive directors on the board and
considers them as employees, demonstrating that shareholders recognize the value of human
capital, measured as incentive pay per dollar of fixed salary, as a surrogate for skills embodied in
directors. Several factors influence a firm’s NAHCD, and there is evidence that corporate
governance practice is one such factor. Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007) in relation to human
capital, and Li, Pike, and Haniffa (2008) in relation to intellectual capital, found that board size,
proportion of independent directors, role of the chairperson, and audit committee composition
influenced a firm’s disclosure. A point of difference is that Li et al. (2008) used a sample in
which executive directors comprised more than one-half of the board, whereas Cerbioni and
Parbonetti (2007) did not provide details of the board composition in their sample.
Previous research has mostly examined the governance aspects of firms’ physical and
financial capital, rather than their human capital (Keenan and Aggestam, 2001). There is,
however, a growing understanding that human capital is important in creating and strengthening
the financial capital of firms as future earnings. Thus, as part of good governance practice, firms

11
are obliged to communicate with shareholders about the competitive advantage of this relatively
hidden capital base (Keenan and Aggestam, 2001; Sullivan, 1998). Specifically, this study
focuses on the use of narrative, which is the predominant type of human capital disclosure of
firms. Li et al. (2008) find that 72% of human capital disclosure is narrative in annual reports for
a sample of 100 UK listed companies. Analysis of 253 observations in this study confirms that
narrative is the predominant human capital disclosure, compared with visual human capital
disclosure and numerical human capital disclosure. Given that little is known about who is
behind the NAHCD in firms, this study investigates the governance attributes—specifically,
independent directors on the remuneration committee—and their relationship to NAHCD.
Evidence provides important insights for businesses to identify the specific roles played by
independent directors on the remuneration committee for NAHCD.
NAHCD
Consideration of NAHCD as an outcome of sound corporate governance is compelling,
in light of evidence that lack of such disclosure can lead to shareholders underestimating future
earnings and firms’ increasing their cost of capital (Van der Meer-Kooistra and Zijlstra, 2001).
Higher levels of discretionary NAHCD can reduce the risk level perceived by shareholders and
reduce information asymmetry between shareholders who have access to companies’ private
information and those who do not (Zhang, 2001). Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007) used a sample
of biotechnology firms in the European Union to investigate NAHCD as a component in their
studies of intellectual-capital disclosure and the influence of corporate governance attributes.
They reviewed the management discussion and analysis section of annual reports. They found
corporate governance attributes strongly influenced the disclosure quality and quantity. The
present study, however, investigates the top listed companies considered the standard-setters of
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best practice, and is a longitudinal study over nine years. As noted earlier in this paper, in
contrast with the previous two studies—Li et al. (2008) and Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007)—this
study focuses on boards dominated by independent directors.
Resource Dependence Theory
Rather than dichotomizing directors as executive and independent, the resource
dependence theory views the entire board as a mechanism that manages to reduce external
uncertainties (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Firms reduce uncertainties by effective selection of
resources and strategies to increase survival likelihood (Singh, House, and Tucker, 1986). This
resource selection includes acquiring independent directors, and strategies include discretionary
NAHCD. In addition to reducing uncertainty in firms, directors bring resources such as
information, skills, and legitimacy (Hillman, Canella, and Paetzold, 2000). Independent
directors, an external resource procured by firms, are business experts and influential figures in
the community (Hillman et al., 2000). Such independent directors heavily dominate the top 30
Sri Lankan boards, as a way to respond to potential environmental demands of the businesses.
These environmental demands include greater transparency in discretionary disclosure to inform
about future earnings to shareholders. The involvement of independent directors in remuneration
committees enables them to obtain firm-specific information, independently evaluate the
relevance of this information to the firm value, and inform the board. The result is that firms are
able to communicate independently evaluated firm-specific information to gain credibility
among shareholders. However, the entire board responds to environmental demands, and
effectively functioning boards have an optimal number of representatives to respond with valuerelevant NAHCD to meet investor expectations. The boards in this study are comprised of a large
proportion of independent—rather than executive—directors. This study takes the view that
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boards act collectively to determine disclosure decisions and those independent directors on the
audit and remuneration committees help the board as providers of NAHCD information. The
independent directors in remuneration committees are essential as regards the depth and breadth
of NAHCD recommended to the board, and the board is important as the ‘gatekeeper’ of
NAHCD to shareholders.

DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES
Dependent Variable (NAHCD)
This study examines the role of corporate governance attributes in the best-practice code
on NAHCD. The NAHCD is constructed for each firm as the total frequency (i.e., number of
times) of human capital disclosed in a firm’s annual report. Outlined below are the governance
attributes included in this study and the hypotheses developed.

Predictor Variables
Proportion of independent directors on the board (B-BALANCE). The best-practice
code requires that at least 2 or one-third of the total directors on the board—whichever is
greater—should be independent directors, and that independent directors must declare their
independence at least annually, based on criteria set by the best-practice code. Cerbioni and
Parbonetti (2007) demonstrate a positive association between independent directors and human
capital disclosure with European biotechnology firms as a way of reducing agency conflicts, but
admit that a sound corporate governance system characterizes the involvement of independent
directors in board-appointed committees. Not focusing on the agency conflicts but consistent
with Cerbioni and Parbonetti’s admission, this study using the resource-dependence perspective
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takes the view that independent directors on board-appointed committees add value to the board
by helping the board to respond to investor demands with firm-specific discretionary disclosure,
such as NAHCD. Hence, this study expects a positive association to exist between the proportion
of independent directors and NAHCD.

H1: The proportion of independent directors on the board has a positive influence on the
NAHCD level.

Number of independent directors on the remuneration committee (N-IDIR-RCOM).
Cerbioni and Parbonetti’s (2007) remark that it is the involvement of independent directors on
board-appointed committees rather than their mere representation on the board that leads to a
sound corporate governance system. Early studies in the UK indicate that there is no association
between remuneration committees and management pay, in an era where the highest paid
executives are usually members of the remuneration committee (Main and Johnston, 1993).
Since the publication of the Cadbury report in 1992, which made recommendations on corporate
governance risks and failures, Conyon and Peck (1998) demonstrate that among other things, the
remuneration committee has established transparency in setting the remuneration of senior
executives. They find that the presence of a remuneration committee with independent directors
enables UK firms to align management compensation with firm performance. Their findings lend
to the argument that independent directors’ informing the board about human capital activities
helps the board to inform shareholders about future earnings through NAHCD, and thereby bring
forward future earnings into the current period to increase stock return. The best-practice code
assumes that the remuneration committee is involved in making decisions about forward-looking
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activities rather than monitoring historical activities. The best-practice code also requires the
remuneration committee to make recommendations to the board regarding the content to be
included in the annual report related to remuneration and human-resource matters. Using the
resource-dependence perspective, this study recognizes the involvement of independent directors
in the remuneration committee as a resource that acquires firm-specific, forward-looking valuecreation possibilities through the firm’s human capital, and helps inform the board to determine
NAHCD. The greater involvement of independent directors increases the resource level of
facilitating the board with the depth and breadth of human capital information for NAHCD, thus
this study expects a strong, positive association between the two.

H2: The independent directors on the remuneration committee have a positive influence on the
NAHCD level.

Control Variables
Board size (B-SIZE). Despite the assumption that the board of directors is interested in
the long-term value of the firm (Laux and Laux, 2009), there is no consensus in the literature as
to the recommended optimal size of the board. Jensen (1993) suggested that 8 is the optimal
number. Yermack (1996) found that firms’ market value decreases with larger boards, but
Belkhir (2009) found that larger boards increase firm performance. The Olivencia report in Spain
suggested that the optimal number of directors for an effective board should be between 5 and 15
(Garcia Lara, Garcia Osma, and Penalva, 2007). The best-practice code specifies that a board
should have a minimum of 2 directors but does not specify the maximum. Rather, it states that
the number of directors at the preceding annual general meeting should be the basis for
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determining the total number of directors. However, there is a common agreement among studies
that excessively large boards can become dysfunctional, and from a resource-dependence
perspective, boards of optimal size use the board resources effectively to make better collective
decisions. Combining the previous findings on optimal board size, this study sets a maximum
limit of 14 directors for an effective board size with a mean value of 8, and expects effective
boards to make more NAHCD.
Number of independent directors on the audit committee (N-IDIR-ACOM). The
findings from literature concerning the influence of the number of independent directors on the
audit committee on the NAHCD level are conflicting. Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007) examine
the majority presence of independent directors in committees (audit, nomination, and
remuneration) as a single variable and find a positive association with human capital disclosure
in European biotechnology firms. Their study however does not identify the association between
each committee separately and the human capital disclosure. The audit committee’s
responsibilities include making adequate disclosure in financial statements, assessing and
managing risk, disclosing risk-management activities in financial statements, and conducting
matters related to the hiring of auditors (Laux and Laux, 2009). McMullen (1996) finds that audit
committees help to enhance reliable financial reporting, and Ho and Wong (2001) find that audit
committees help to increase firms’ quality of financial reporting.
The Financial Reporting Council (2010) identifies the primary role of the audit
committee as ensuring that the interests of shareholders are protected through financial
disclosure and internal control. In relation to voluntary disclosure, Li et al. (2008) find that the
audit committee size positively influences the intensity of intellectual capital disclosure, but find
no relationship with intellectual capital disclosure as a proportion of the total corporate
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disclosure in annual reports. Audit committees are likely to obtain a very little firm-specific
knowledge about human capital resource items, since these items are not a routine audit function
and human capital-related activities are usually outside the purview of the audit committee.
The best-practice code identifies the roles of the audit committee as reviewing the scope
and result of an audit and its effectiveness, and the independence and objectivity of the auditors.
The best-practice code notes that the audit committee should meet relevant financial-reporting
requirements, and that it can play a vital role in historical and financial disclosure. The code also
recommends that at least 50% of the directors on the audit committee should be independent, and
that an independent director should be the chairperson. Using a resource-dependence theoretical
underpinning, this study recognizes that the involvement of independent directors is a resource
helping the board by informing on matters mainly relating to financial reporting rather than nonfinancial reporting.
Number of board meetings (N-MEET). The number of board meetings is a proxy for
the level of monitoring, to indicate the monitoring effectiveness of the board (Vafeas, 1999). The
best-practice code requires boards to meet at least four times a year. Since the input of
information about NAHCD is expected to be determined by the level of involvement of
independent directors on the remuneration committee and the decisions to disclose NAHCD are
determined by the proportion of independent directors on the board, this study expects that the
number of board meetings will have little influence on NAHCD.
The firm characteristics influence the level of corporate governance; hence this study
includes firm size, level of growth, and level of debt, using the findings of previous research.
Size of the firm (SIZE). Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) and Meek, Roberts, and Gray
(1995) find that the size of the firm positively associates with discretionary disclosure.
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Shareholders expect more information from larger firms; larger firms have lower collection and
dissemination cost of voluntary information, and find that voluntary disclosure can help them to
lower their cost for additional capital from sources outside the firm (Cerbioni and Parbonetti,
2007). Market capitalization and total assets are proxies of size, but because this study uses them
indirectly in other control variables, and to avoid the undue influence of a single attribute, this
study instead uses annual sales as a proxy for size, as used in previous governance studies (Eng
and Mak, 2003; Li et al., 2008). It is expected that firm size strongly, and positively, associates
with NAHCD.
Level of debt (LEVERAGE). An increase in leverage can increase the monitoring level
of the board (Garcia Lara et al., 2007); and associates with greater voluntary disclosures of nonfinancial (Eng and Ma, 2003) and intellectual capital (Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007). Firms
mitigate the high monitoring costs imposed by greater voluntary disclosure. These monitoring
costs do not exist for firms that are debt free, and this study expects that the leverage level
positively associates with NAHCD.
Level of growth (GROWTH). The market price over the net book value is a proxy for
growth rate of firms (Smith and Watts, 1992). The high-growth firms have a greater information
asymmetry and they bridge the information gap by discretionary disclosure to meet investor
expectations (Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007; Eng and Mak, 2003). Industry sectors distinctly
characterize as either “old economy with low growth rate” or “new economy with high growth
rate” sectors (Gerpott, Thomas, and Hoffman, 2008). This study expects that firms high growth
rate has a positive influence on NAHCD.

RESEARCH METHODS
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Annual Reports
Several studies acknowledge the importance of annual reports as vehicles for discharging
accountability (Boyne and Law, 1991; Chang and Most, 1985). The annual report is the firm’s
main communication tool; it has more credibility than other media channels, and is produced
necessarily and regularly to meet investor requirements (Marston and Shrivers, 1985). The
annual report presents the board of directors with the challenges of communicating mandatory
financial results and making discretionary disclosures related to future earnings possibilities from
resources not recognised in the financial statements (Davison, 2002).
Human Capital Disclosure Items
Human capital in this study is comprised of 25 resource items with pre-operational
definitions: know-how, vocational qualifications, career development, training programs, union
activity, employee thanked, employee featured, executive compensation plans, other employee
compensation plans, employee benefits, employee share ownership plans, employee share option
ownership plans, expert seniority, employee numbers, professional experience, education levels,
expert seniority, age of employees, entrepreneurship of staff, workplace safety, equity issues
(gender, race, and religion), equity issues (disability), value-added per expert staff, value added
per non-expert staff, and staff involvement with the community (Abeysekera, 2007, pp. 79–88;
Abeysekera and Guthrie, 2004). The human capital represents a volatile intangible base that is a
major contributor to the development of financial and physical capital (Edvinsson and Malone,
1997).
Content Analysis
Studies of discretionary disclosure (Al-Tuwaijri, Christensen, and Hughes, 2004; Gray et
al., 1995) and studies examining the influence of corporate governance attributes on human
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capital disclosure (Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007; Li et al., 2008) frequently use content analysis
in data collection from annual reports. This study develops 20 NAHCD items with pre-defined
operational definitions after pilot testing for relevance with a large listed firm outside this
sample. It then identifies NAHCD from annual reports of firms in the study sample, looking for
meanings (latent content analysis) that meet pre-operational definitions. Two coders who are
experienced in content analysis identified NAHCD by frequency of occurrence in the annual
report of each firm, recording 1 for each occurrence and 0 for no occurrence. The NAHCD for a
firm was the total frequency of 20 resource items in its annual report. The coding of content by
two coders allowed measurement of the degree of agreement as a measure of reliability, using
Scott’s π (greater than 0.9).
The study examines NAHCD in the entire annual reports of the top 30 firms by market
capitalization in the CSE from 1998 to 2006 (nine years). The total sample size is 253, after
removing a few firms from the dataset due to delisting or inability to obtain their annual reports.
Firms removed from the sample comprised two in 1998, two in 1999, one in 2000, one in 2001,
three in 2002, three in 2003, two in 2004, and one in 2005.
Measurement of Variables
The study includes NAHCD as the dependent variable to examine the relationship
between the level of disclosure and corporate governance attributes. It investigates two corporate
governance attributes: B-BALANCE, and N-IDIR-RCOM. The study obtains data from firms’
annual reports and the Colombo Stock Exchange database. Table 1 summarizes the
operationalizing of both the dependent and predictor variables. The following regression
equation tests results by pooling firms across nine years using within-effect estimation in a panel
dataset (Hausman, 1978).
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Dependent Variable it = b0+b1B-BALANCEit +b2N-IDIR-RCOMit +b3B-SIZEit +b4N-IDIRACOMit + b5 N-MEETit +b6 SIZEit + b7 LEVERAGEit + b8 GROWTHit +z
---------------------------Insert Table 1 about here
----------------------------

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 outlines the descriptive statistics. The independent directors dominate the boards
and exceed the benchmark of one-third representation set by the best-practice code. On average,
two independent directors serve on the audit committees. On average, the boards meet six to
seven times a year, which is above the best-practice code’s benchmark of four times a year. A
board of directors has an average of eight members. A small number of independent directors are
represented in remuneration committees (mean =1.2, standard deviation =1.6) compared to
independent directors represented on the board (B-SIZE mean =7.9, and B-BALANCE mean
=0.67), pointing to it being the involvement of independent directors in remuneration committees
that adds value as a resource for NAHCD.

---------------------------Insert Table 2 about here
----------------------------

Appendix presents the correlation matrix with NAHCD, governance attributes, and
control variables. The correlation values are low, and indicate no multicollinearity. The number
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of independent directors on the remuneration committee shows a positive significant correlation
with NAHCD. The proportion of independent directors’ shows a positive but not significant
correlation with NAHCD. All governance related control variables show a positive correlation
with NAHCD. The growth-control variable although positive in value, but is not significant for
NAHCD. The size variable has a significant and positive correlation, indicating that larger firms
make more NAHCD. Firms with smaller boards have a higher proportion of independent
directors.

Panel Data Regression Analysis
Table 3 shows the pooled firms across nine years using within-effect estimation (fixedeffect regression) results for NAHCD (within-effect R2=0.178, probability F=0.001). The results
show that the proportion of independent directors representing the board does not influence the
level of NAHCD, a finding that is inconsistent with H1. This might have been because some
independent directors are involved in board-appointed committees helping the board in
determining NAHCD, while other independent directors are not. The number of independent
directors on the remuneration committee positively associates with the level of NAHCD, which
is consistent with H2. The involvement of independent directors on the remuneration committee
is a value-adding resource to the board, helping the board to disclose NAHCD to inform
shareholders about future earnings, and thereby supporting a sound corporate governance system
(Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007). The board size measured by the total number of directors
positively influences the level of NAHCD. The mean B-SIZE of 7.8 in this study is consistent
with the optimal board size proposed by Jensen (1993), and is well within the mean board size
recommended by the Olivencia Report (Garcia Lara et al., 2007). Although this study expected a
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weak positive association, the number of independent directors on the audit committee shows no
influence on NAHCD. This confirms that the role of the audit committee is primarily informing
about financial reporting to the board in the presence of a remuneration committee (Ho and
Wong, 2001; Laux and Laux, 2009; McMuller, 1996). The number of meetings has no influence
on the levels of NAHCD. Although the board meets on average eight times a year, more than the
number of meetings stipulated by the best-practice code, the higher frequency of board meetings,
a monitoring activity, does not help NAHCD. As predicted, the firm size positively associates
with NAHCD. On the contrary to a predicted positive association, this study found no significant
relationship between leverage and NAHCD. Since the sample firms have positive net asset
balances, it may have lead to the no relationship between leverage and NAHCD. Although the
growth rate of firms was predicted to have a weak positive association with NAHCD; in this
study has no influence on NAHCD. This might have been influenced by the low growth rates of
firms in the sample. The high-growth technological sector is insignificant in Sri Lanka, with only
one telecommunication firm listed since 2003 (included in the sample).
---------------------------Insert Table 3 about here
----------------------------

Comparison of findings of this study with previous studies examining NAHCD and
governance attributes reveals differences in context. For instance, the findings in this study
contrast with those of Li et al. (2008), who find the presence of independent directors on the
audit committee to have a positive influence on the level of intellectual-capital disclosure. This
study does not confirm the assertion by Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007) that a higher proportion
of independent directors influence the human capital disclosure level. The studies of Cerbioni
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and Parbonetti (2007) in Europe and of Li et al. (2008) in the UK support the agency perspective,
whereas evidence from this study on NAHCD provides little support for it. Furthermore, the
differences in objectives and methodologies between this study and those studies may have
contributed to the differences in results. As noted earlier, Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007) review
only the management and discussion sections of the annual reports. Moreover, they count
disclosure by number of words (i.e., manifest content analysis) to determine the quality and
quantity of disclosure. Li et al. (2008) measured intellectual-capital disclosure as an index they
developed. In contrast, this study measures human capital disclosure by the frequency of
narrative disclosure of each resource item identified in reference to its meaning (latent content
analysis), rather than aggregated disclosure comprising narrative, visual, and numerical
information, which was the focus of the aforementioned studies.

Additional Analysis
Reaction to the increase of the proportion of independent directors on the board
As shown in Table 4, as additional evidence, this study examines the influence on NAHCD of
the independent directors in remuneration committees, for firms with different proportions of
independent directors on the board. The proportion of independent directors greater than 0.2, and
in increments of 0.2 up to 0.8, is examined as a separate model. The firm size is a significant
variable, and is consistent with the main model. As the proportion of independent directors on
the board increases, the N-IDIR-RCOM coefficient increases (5.43 with independent directors on
board greater than 0.2, and 6.15 with independent directors on board greater than 0.8), indicating
that independent directors on remuneration committees have an increasing influence on
NAHCD.
----------------------------
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Insert Table 4 about here
----------------------------

Reaction to the absence of independent directors from the remuneration committee and to the
absence of independent directors from the audit committee
As further evidence of the influence of independent directors on the remuneration committee,
this study investigates the relationship between NAHCD and the corporate governance attributes
if independent directors are absent from the remuneration committee. The results (details not
shown in the paper) indicate that although the board compositions are similar, the NAHCD level
is lower (mean =15.1, standard deviation =16.8) for firms without independent directors on
remuneration committees. The predictor variable B-BALANCE (mean =0.6, standard deviation
=0.3), and the control variables B-SIZE (mean =7.3, standard deviation =2.5), N-MEET (mean
=7.6, standard deviation =3.7), and other control variables are similar to the originally
investigated sample. The results indicate that in the absence of independent directors on the
remuneration committee, the independent directors on the audit committee become the servers of
NAHCD to the board (coefficient =3.38, probability =0.001). The only other significant variable
is size (coefficient =2.61, probability =0.001). However, the model predictability is extremely
low (within-effect R2=0.013, probability F=0.001). As a separate analysis, the main sample
disregarded firms without independent directors in the audit committee and the re-run model
indicated that N-IDIR-RCOM coefficient increases to 19.1 (probability =0.02) compared to the
main model N-IDIR-RCOM coefficient of 5.09.

Reaction to the minimum board size
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Garcia Lara et al. (2007), citing the Olivencia Report, note that the effective board size
should be between 5 and 15. A model run disregarding firms with board sizes below 5 shows
results similar to the original model (details are not shown here). The within-effect R2 is 0.173
(number of observations =244); the significant variables are B-SIZE (coefficient =1.64,
probability =0.09), N-IDIR-RCOM (coefficient =5.09, probability =0.001), and SIZE
(coefficient =6.0, probability =0.001). Findings in this study therefore conform to the optimal
board size recommended by the Olivencia Report.

Reaction to the maximum board size
As additional evidence for the influence of the board size, this study investigates the
relationship between NAHCD and the corporate governance attributes by reducing the board
size. The maximum board size in this study is 13. The study conducts separate within-effect
regressions by restricting the maximum board size and excluding observations above the
maximum board size, first by restricting the maximum board size to 12 (within R2=.179); then to
11 (within R2=.175); and finally 10 (within R2=.12). The results in all these separate regressions
are similar to the main study but the model explanatory power shows a decreasing trend with the
decrease in maximum board size. Although Yermack’s (1996) study observes increasing
functionality of the board with decreasing board size for corporate performance, which is a
historical perspective of the firm, this study finds decreasing functionality of the board from
maximum board size of 13 (mean =7.9, median =8) to 10 (mean =7.3, median =8) for NAHCD,
which is a futuristic perspective of the firm.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
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The findings indicate that the committee—particularly the remuneration committee—has
a positive impact on the level of NAHCD of the top 30 Sri Lankan listed firms. The proportion
of independent directors and the number of meetings have no influence on NAHCD, thus
weakening theoretical support for an agency perspective for this sample of firms. The monitoring
role of the board in having more board meetings and resolving conflicting agendas between
shareholders and management had little relevance for NAHCD.
An important lesson from this study is the limited understanding of NAHCD in the
context of the remuneration committee and board composition. Heavy reliance on independent
directors appears to create a knowledge deficit at the board level about firm-specific, forwardlooking human capital information for disclosure—a deficit to address particularly via
information obtained by independent directors from the remuneration committee. As this study
demonstrates, independent directors on the remuneration committee facilitate the knowledge
transfer of firm-specific details of human capital to the board that makes decisions about
NAHCD.
The findings of this study have limitations. The study examines only the top 30 listed
firms; therefore, these findings might not be applicable to all listed firms or to firms not listed on
the main board. The analysis is limited to annual reports, and integration of firms’ other media
disclosures might provide more comprehensive information about NAHCD. The “independence”
of independent directors is assumed as stated in annual reports, since the reports do not
necessarily warrant the application of criteria for verification. Corporate governance attributes
not mentioned in the best-practice code and different from this study can influence NAHCD.
Nevertheless, the findings of this study provide several researchable topics, as there is
little evidence-based documentation of either governance attributes or numerical disclosure of
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human capital in a developing-country setting. This study reviews NAHCD as a collection of 20
resource items, but a future study may examine how corporate governance attributes predict each
human capital resource item separately. A future study also could examine the governance
attributes in this study with firms that place less reliance on independent directors. The
communication of human capital can comprise narrative, visual, and numerical types of
disclosure. Reasons for the selection of particular disclosure types by firms are wide-ranging but
include accountability, transparency, and marketability. Photographs, pictures, and charts
constitute the visual type of human capital disclosure. Studies suggest that visual disclosure can
manipulate in a manner that gives a better impression than an individual’s interpretation of
narrative or numerical information alone. Future study may contribute to empirical evidence on
the “imagined” world of future earnings, as to whether visual disclosure of human capital
obstructs or facilitates transparency of information from the perspective of corporate governance
practices. Furthermore, a future study could explore whether implementation of the best-practice
code of governance effective from 2008 for listed firms in Sri Lanka has a moderating effect on
NAHCD. As found in this study, some governance attributes of the best-practice code of
corporate governance have no influence on the level of NAHCD, perhaps because the main
thrust of the best-practice code is on financial disclosure rather than on aspects of forwardlooking discretionary disclosure.
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APPENDIX
Correlation matrix of narrative intellectual capital disclosure
NAHCD

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1
1

B-BALANCE
Pr

2

N-IDIR-RCOM
Pr

3

B-SIZE
Pr

4

N-IDIR-ACOM
Pr

5

N-MEET
Pr

6

SIZE in ln
Pr

7

LEVERAGE
Pr

8

GROWTH
Pr

0.01
0.83
0.43***
0.001
0.18**
0.001

0.11*
0.096
-0.12*
0.07

0.32***
0.001

1

0.40***
0.001
0.21**
0.001
0.44**
0.001
-0.12*
0.054
0.03
0.687

0.14**
0.027
0.17***
0.007
-0.07
0.255
0.00
0.962
-0.04
0.500

0.60***
0.001
0.34***
0.001
0.34***
0.001
-0.11*
0.070
-0.04
0.553

0.30***
0.001
0.35***
0.001
0.16***
0.009
-0.20***
0.001
-0.11*
0.087

1
1

Significance: *** at 1%; ** at 5%; and, * at 10%.

1

0.28***
0.001
0.28***
0.001
-0.06
0.370
-0.02
0.796

1

0.24***
0.001
-0.14**
0.022
-0.19***
0.002

1

-0.34***
0.001
-0.05
0.432

1

0.26***
0.001

1

37
TABLE 1
Variable Definitions and Measurement
Variable

Proxy

Measurement

Data source

Total narrative
human capital
disclosed

Total frequency count of narrative
disclosure of human capital (20
resource items)

Annual reports

B-BALANCE

Independent
directors on the
board

Proportion of independent directors on
the board

Annual reports

N-IDIRRCOM

Independent
directors on
committees other
than the audit
committee

Number of independent directors on the
remuneration committee

Annual reports

B-SIZE

Board size

Total number of directors on the board

Annual reports

N-IDIRACOM

Independent
directors on the
audit committee

Number of independent directors on the
audit committee

Annual reports

N-MEET

Board meetings

Number of board meetings held in a
financial year

Annual reports

SIZE

Size of the firm

Natural logarithms of total annual sales

Colombo Stock
Exchange
database

LEVERAGE

Level of debt

Total assets over total liabilities

Annual report

GROWTH

Level of growth

Market value of ordinary shares divided Annual reports
by book value of ordinary shareholders’
equity

Dependent
NAHCD

Independent

Control
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TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics of Variables for the Overall Sample
Variable
NAHCD

Mean

S.D.

Median

25.2

28.5

15

0.67

0.3

0.74

1.2

1.6

0

7.9

2.4

8

2.1

1.7

3

7.6

4.0

6

15.2

1.4

15.3

5.1

20.2

1.9

1.2

0.7

1

B-BALANCE
N-IDIR-RCOM
B-SIZE
N-IDIR-ACOM
N-MEET
SIZE (Rs. Mn) (in ln)
LEVERAGE
GROWTH

Please refer to Table 1 for variable definitions.
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TABLE 3
Panel data within-effect regression results for NAHCD
NAHCD
B-BALANCE
N-IDIR-RCOM
B-SIZE
N-IDIR-ACOM
N-MEET
SIZE (Rs. Mn) in ln
LEVERAGE
GROWTH
CONSTANT

NAHCD

NAHCD

Coefficient

Pr

-1.97

0.78

5.09***

0.00

1.49*

0.08

1.82

0.14

-0.33

0.47

5.95***

0.00

0.03
3.05
-86.45
0.178
0.001

0.74
0.18
0.00

Standard error

7.03
1.31
0.86
1.24
0.46
1.77
0.08
2.26
28.84

Within-effect R2
Probability F
Number of observations = 253; Number of groups = 53; Average observation per group = 4.8;
Significance level: *** at 1%, ** at 5% and at *10%.
Please refer to Table 1 for variable definitions.
Fixed-effect regression model:
Dependent Variable it = b0+b1B-BALANCEit +b2N-IDIR-RCOMit +b3B-SIZEit +b4N-IDIRACOMit + b5 N-MEETit +b6 SIZEit + b7 LEVERAGEit + b8 GROWTHit +z
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TABLE 4
Panel data within-effect regression results for firms with different proportions of independent
directors on board
Proportion of
independent directors
on the board

>0.2

>0.4

>0.6

>0.8

Coef.

Pr

Coef.

Pr

Coef.

Pr

Coef.

Pr

-7.54

0.37

-24.39*

0.02

-23.86

0.28

-0.13

1.00

5.44***

0.00

5.64***

0.00

6.06***

0.00

6.15***

0.00

B-SIZE

1.27

0.16

1.12

0.25

0.96

0.41

0.65

0.63

N-IDIR-ACOM

1.56

0.23

1.92

0.18

1.78

0.29

1.95

0.37

-0.32

0.51

-0.38

0.49

-0.28

0.72

-0.22

0.82

5.72***

0.00

5.81***

0.00

5.80**

0.01

5.54**

0.02

0.05
2.59
-76.00
0.187
0.001

0.60
0.28
0.02

0.04
4.86*
-65.72
0.245
0.001

0.73
0.08
0.05

0.02
6.30*
-66.04
0.227
0.001

0.85
0.06
0.12

0.00
7.09*
-82.57
0.159
0.001

0.98
0.05
0.13

B-BALANCE
N-IDIR-RCOM

N-MEET
SIZE (Rs. Mn) in ln
LEVERAGE
GROWTH
CONSTANT
Within-effect R2
Probability F

Significance level: *** at 1%, ** at 5% and at *10%.
Please refer to Table 1 for variable definitions.
Fixed effect regression model:
Dependent Variable it = b0+b1B-BALANCEit +b2N-IDIR-RCOMit +b3B-SIZEit +b4N-IDIRACOMit + b5 N-MEETit +b6 SIZEit + b7 LEVERAGEit + b8 GROWTHit +z

